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Mark A. Dalton, the Appellee, pursuant to Rule 35 of
Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure,

respectfully

submits

Petition for Rehearing to the Utah Court of Appeals.

this

The four

points of law or fact which the Court overlooked or misapplied
follow:
POINT I
frHE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW,
ON AN APPEAL OF AN
ADDITUR, THE APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT
"VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND ALL REASONABLE
INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT."
A REVIEWING COURT ONLY REVERSES THE
LOWER COURT'S ADDITUR DECISION IF THERE
IS NO REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE DECISION.
The first paragraph of the Utah Court of Appeals'
Memorandum Decision1 begins:
We note at the offset that a court
must view the evidence and all
reasonable
inferences
drawn
therefrom
in
the
light
most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
Pratt v. Products. Inc., 885 P.2d
786, 787 (Utah 1994).
Pratt was a garden variety appeal of a jury verdict and sets forth
the correct standard of review for an appeal of a jury verdict.
"On appeal from a jury's verdict, the court views the evidence and
all

reasonable

inferences

drawn

favorable to a jury's verdict."

therefrom

in

the

light

Pratt, supra at 787.

this case is not an appeal of a jury verdict.

most

However,

It is an appeal of

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit A.
1

District Judge Lewis's decision to award an additur.

The standard

for reviewing Judge Lewis's ultimate decision is set forth in
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d

789, 805

(Utah

1991):
In
reviewing
the
judge's
ultimate
decision . . . we will reverse only if
there is no reasonable basis for the
decision.
A threshold purpose of the Crookston decision, was to clear up the
confusion about the standard of review applied by trial courts on
motions challenging a jury's verdict and the different standard of
review applied by appellate courts of the lower court's ultimate
decision.

Crookston at 802.

This Court incorrectly applied the

standard of review which a lower court applies to the initial
motion challenging the verdict.

In short, this Court mistakenly

reviewed the verdict directly without considering the intermediate
action [additur decision] by the trial court.

See Andreason v.

Aetna Casualty Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993).

Had the

court applied the correct standard of view, it would have reached
a different conclusion.

As set forth in Point II of this Petition,

there is plenty of reasonable basis for the additur decision2.

2

The factual support for Judge Lewis's additur decision is also
summarized in pp. 16-19 of Dalton's Brief of Appellee.
2

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
DAMAGES WERE >vSO INADEQUATE AS TO
INDICATE A DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE BY
THE JURY."
A.

Introduction,
After misstating the standard of view, the Court of

Appeals subsequently implied that the lower court "did not find
that the damages were so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of
the evidence by the jury." However, the lower court did find that
damages were so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the
evidence by the jury and there is considerable record support for
the District Court's decision.
B.

District Judge Lewis correctly found that the damages awarded
were "so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence
by the jury."
Judge Lewis in her Memorandum Decision said:
[I]f an award shows that the jury
misapplied or failed to take into
account proven facts, or misunderstood
or disregarded the law, or made findings
clearly against the evidence and the
verdict is outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown
by the evidence, it should not be
permitted to stand.
* * *

In such instances, the remedy is to
order a modification of the verdict to
bring it within the evidence.
* * *

3

The Court finds the amount of $20,007.00
for future medical expenses to have been
undisputed and uncontroverted at trial.
* * *

This Court finds that the award of
$3,000.00 does not bear [a] reasonable
relationship to the evidence adduced at
trial . . . .
An additur is therefore
granted.
(Memorandum Decision, pp. 23.)
A copy of the Memorandum is
attached as Exhibit B.
The foregoing shows that Judge Lewis, contrary to the opinion of
this Court, did find that the damages were so inadequate as to
evidence a disregard of the evidence by the jury.
C.

The record support.
Only three witnesses, other than Dalton, testified on

the subject of Daltonfs future medical expenses.
Hodnett, a plastic surgeon, testified:
His [Dalton1 s] CT scan showed that there
was a chip of bone from the bottom of
the eye socket down the . . . sinus.
And if he had the numbness when I saw
him, and looking at the CT scan, . . .
he may still have need of what is called
plate and screw fixation, or another
open procedure to possibly remove a bone
chip from around his nerve which was the
nerve that controls the sensation to his
lip.
(R. 770, Ins, 24-25; 771, Ins. 1-8).
* * *

The doctor's fees would probably be in
the range of $2,500 - $3,500 . . . and
. . . probably in the range of $5,000 $8,000 in hospital fees, I would assume.
4

Dr. Richard

(R. 771, Ins. 23-25; 772, Ins. 1, 7, 9-10).
Dr. Hodnett also testified that Dalton would require
an osteotomy3 and that the cost would be $15,000 (R. 783-784).
Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, a specialist in maxillofacial
surgery, also testified:
I think that at some time, he [Dalton]
will have to have surgery . . . .
(R. 840, Ins. 17-18).
The
arthroplasty.

surgery

recommended

by

Mikesell

was

an

Mikesell estimated the cost at $2,500 - $3,000 and

$8,000 for the hospital fees (R. 836-837).

He also testified that

Dalton needs a bridge that could cost somewhere between $1,200 $1,300 (R. 859, 860, In. 3).
Herold called Dr. Stadler, a specialist in physical
rehabilitation, as a witness.

He is not a surgeon.

Further,

Stadler did not controvert the cost of the future surgery.
issue was undisputed.

That

While it is true that Stadler opined that

Dalton would not benefit from future surgery, the only injury
Stadler was concerned with was facial nerve damage (R. 874, 876).
He did not address the injuries testified to by Hodnett and
Mikesell. Hence, he did not directly contradict Dalton!s need for
surgery, nor its cost. Further, (1) Stadler was not a surgeon, so
his testimony warranted very little weight; and (2) his opinion was

3

An osteotomy is the rebreaking of the jaw bones and putting
them in the proper place (R. 784, Ins. 1-7).
5

based only upon feeling Dalton's face with his hands. Therefore,
the trial court properly discounted Stadler's opinion and believed
the testimony of the surgeons who were qualified on the subjects of
the need and cost for future surgery. In doing so, the trial court
acted well within its discretion. The trial court, in granting an
additur, does not determine whether there is any evidence at all
supporting the verdict but whether the verdict is within or outside
the limits of a reasonable appraisal of damages.

Bodon v.

Suhrmdan, 8 U.2d 42, 47, 372 P.2d 826 (1958); c.f. King v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 212 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1949) (where there is a
substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue, the Supreme
Court will defer to the discretion exercised by the trial court in
granting a new trial); see Carlson v. BMW Industries, Inc., 744
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987) (the trial court's grant or denial of
an additur will not be set aside on appeal, unless the court acted
arbitrarily or capriciously); Creamer v. Troiano, 494 P.2d 738, 740
(Ariz. App. 1972) (we do not believe that here, where there is a
conflict in the evidence as to damages, that the trial court should
be reversed when it determines that the additur was required);
Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251, 255 (Nev. 1984) (reviewing
Court must accord deference to the point of view of the trial
judge, since he had the opportunity to weigh the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses).

6

POINT III
DALTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
IS NOT MERITLESS.
THE JUDGMENT AND
MEMORANDUM DECISION AWARDING A NEW TRIAL
UNLESS THE APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE
ADDITUR, WAS NOT AND IS NOT A FINAL
APPEALABLE JUDGMENT.
Dalton, in his Motion for Summary Disposition, said
that the court's decision to award a new trial if the appellant
declined to accept the additur, is not a final appealable order.
A portion of the Memorandum Decision and subsequent judgment
follow:
The defendant may accept this ruling or
request a new trial.
(Memorandum
Decision, p. 6.)
* * *

The court having inquired of the jury as
to its verdict directs that judgment be
entered in accordance with . . . its
Memorandum Decision entered September
22, 1993 and incorporated herein by
reference (Judgment, p. 2. A copy of
the Judgment is attached as Exhibit C ) .
In Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 U.2d 185, 186 (Utah 1964), the Utah
Supreme Court explained that an order comparable to the one at
issue is not a final appealable order:
The right of appeal is from a final
judgment. Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec.
9, . . . [Rule 4 U.R.A.P.]. The order
granting a new trial is not a final
judgment . . . the proper redress is
either a petition for an interlocutory
appeal which may be granted in a proper
case; or the claimed error can be
preserved and reviewed if necessary upon
the final outcome of the case . . . .

C.f. Howell v. Marmpeaaso Compania Naviera S.A., 566 F.2d 992, 993
(5th Cir. 1978) ; Mauriello v. University of Medicine & Dentistry,
781 F.2d 46, 49 (3d. Cir. 1986).

(When the district court issues

a remitter order declaring a new trial unless the plaintiff concurs
to a lesser recovery, the order is not final or appealable until
the plaintiff accepts the remitter.)
POINT IV
THIS COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ORAL
ARGUMENT ON THIS APPEAL.
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that oral argument is required unless the appellate court
appropriately concludes that:
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or (2) the
disputed issue or set of issues, has
been recently authoritatively decided;
or (3) . . . the decisional process
would not be significantly aided by oral
argument.
In this case, the appeal is not frivolous. This Court
mistakenly awarded the relief sought on appeal.

The dispositive

issues, of what standard of review is applied to the ultimate
decision granting an additur, has not been authoritatively decided.
Neither has the issue of whether an order granting a new trial
unless an additur is accepted, is a final appealable judgment.
Oral

argument

was

and

still

is

crucial

for an

appropriate review and consideration of the issues presented in
this case. An oral presentation explaining the correct standard of
review and showing that the lower court's order was not a final
8

appealable judgment, would have prevented this Court from picking
the wrong standard of review and reviewing an order that is not
final or appealable.

In short, deciding this case, without oral

argument was plainly and simply contrary to Rule 29. The remedy is
to grant a rehearing and oral argument.
CONCLUSION
This Court, applied the wrong standard of review to
the lower court's additur decision. Moreover, the Court mistakenly
overlooked the fact that the lower court's judgment was not final.
In addition, this Court failed to comply with Rule 29 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Each of the foregoing demands a

rehearing on the issues raised in this Petition.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Marvin A. Dalton, Jr.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No, 940170-CA

Brian G. Herold,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
( J u l y 2 7 , 1995)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Attorneys;

Mark Dalton Dunn and Kevin D. Swenson, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Garff1, and Wilkins.
GARFF, Judge:
We note at the outset that a court must "view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to [the jury's] verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.. 885
P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1994).
Herold argues that the trial court erred in granting the
motion for additur. We agree.
Before a trial court can enrertain a motion for additur, the
court must find that the damages awarded were "so inadequate as
to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the jury." Dupuis v.
Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). Only if the trial court
so finds can it then consider the motion to determine if "the
influence of passion or prejudice resulted in inadequate
damages." Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah
App. 1990).

1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to appointment
under Utah Code Judicial Administration R3-108(4).

In this case, the trial court gave the jury Instruction
Number 44 which states:
You may award special damages, if proven, for
the reasonable value of medical care,
services and supplies reasonably required and
actually given in the treatment of the
plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar
items that more probably than not will be
required and given in the future.
(Emphasis added).
Our review of the record reveals conflicting medical
evidence on the necessity of future medical care for Dalton's
injuries, and "the evidence does not compel a finding that
reasonable persons would have reached a different measure of
damages." Dupuis, 624 P.2d at 686. The jury, following
instruction number 44, could reasonably have believed that it was
"more probable than not" that Dalton would not require and be
"given [medical care] in the future." Based on the forgoing, the
trial court should never have considered the motion for additur
since the record does not show that the jury disregarded the
evidence. We therefore reverse the trial court's additur and
reinstate the original jury award of special damages in the
amount of $3,000.00.
Because we have reversed the trial court's additur, the
amount of the final judgment falls below Herold's $15,000.00
offer o£-^srblement. Therefore, we also reverse the trial
court's award/ of costs tcv^lton.2

esiding Judge
N

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

2. We find the points raised in Dalton's motion for summary
disposition to be meritless and therefore do not address them.
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989).
2

Exhibit B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARVIN A- DALTON# JR. #
Plaintiff,
vs.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 920903329
:

BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court
on August 10, 1993, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's
motion.

The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and

took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by
counsel, and having considered counsels'' arguments, rules as stated
herein.

The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is

inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special
damages.

The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to

remain at that amount.
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under

FILE COPY

DALTON V, HEROLD

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial.
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the
evidence differently than a jury, mere disagreement is not a
sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur. The power of
a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P. 2d 53 0 (Utah
1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958).

Bodon v.

Suhrmann, makes it clear that if an award shows that the jury
misapplied

or failed

to take

into account proven

facts, or

misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly
against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should
not be permitted to stand.
remains the law in Utah.

Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it

Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in

Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d

685 (Utah 1981), and in Mever v.

Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984).
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the
instant case.

In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was

outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence.
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a

DALTON V. HEROLD

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence." Id
at 828.
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial.
During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell,
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount
of future medical

expenses, if surgery

occurred (and they both

perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00.
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness,
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not
disputed.
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff
had been damaged.

The award for special damages must bear a

reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that the
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to
the evidence adduced at trial.

The plaintiff presented evidence

that his past medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3); and an
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual
special damages.

An additur is therefore granted.

The total

special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of

DALTON V. HEROLD

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

$3,000.00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted
in the amount of $19,910.24.

This amount, when added to the

special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is
consistent with the testimony concerning specials.
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award.
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to special damages and to the evidence.

General

damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over
and above those quantifiable damages such as lest wages and medical
expenses.
clear

Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979).

that

special

damages

are

assessment than general damages.

more

capable

of

It is

definitive

General damages are by their

nature more subjective and difficult to pin down. This Court must
view the general damage award in relation to the original special
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists
between the two.

Where the original award for specials was

$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to
the

evidence, must

be

assessed, with

concerning general damages.

the case

law

in mind

Case law concerning general damages

indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur.

DALTON V. HEROLD

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), the Court ruled
that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages. Id. at
726.

In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App.

1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for
measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather the amount to be
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment."

And, in another

case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc.. 593 P.2d 104
(Okl. App. 1988) it was held that compensation for pain and
suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any
standard by which compensation

can be definitely ascertained, or

the amount actually suffered determined.
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other

that specials

may be subject to additur without modification of

generals. The

two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable.

To illustrate

this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some
circumstances, to award one without the other.

"When the issue of

general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the

DALTON V. HEROLD

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of
wages.

This is the case if the plaintiff's

complaints are

subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood, 551
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976).
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and
suffering, warranted a large amount.

This Court appreciates the

province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award.
In making this ruling,, this Court elects to exercise its
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's
verdict.
The defendant may accept this ruling, or request a new trial.
Dated this

]yucs&ay

of September^ 1993.

5LIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Defendant.

i JUDGMENT
;
]
)
]

Civil No. 920903329PI

)
]

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and
19th, 1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.

George T.

Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant.
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and
answered question one on the verdict form. The jury found that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the

w*%*

negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton.
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3,000.
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for
total

damages

in

the

amount

of

$8,000.

The

verdict

appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson.

was

The Court

having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by
reference, which grants plaintiff's additur in the additional
amount for specials of $19,910.24:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
Brian Herold, as follows:
1.

The plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against the

defendant for special damages in the amount of
$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 80%).
2.

The plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against

the

defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-44. This sum represents interest
at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990
through September, 1993.

2
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The plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against the

defendant for general damages in the amount of
$4,000 ($5,000 x 80%).
The plaintiff

is awarded post-judgment interest

against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§15-1-4 consistent with the judgment accruing at
the rate of 5.72% per annum.
5.

The plaintiff is awarded his costs against the
defendant in the amount of $3,124.40.
The

total

[$18,328.19

judgment
(special

awarded
damages)

is
+

$26,246.99

$794.40

(pre-

judgment interest) + $4,000.00 (general damages) +
$3,124.40 (costs and fees)].
DATED this

M- day of

Z2-v

Leslie A. Lewis
Third District
Approved as to form:

Mark D. Dunn

Attorney for Defendant
4839.j'ud
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